India-Armenia strategic co-op may fall off agenda after change in balance of power in Caucasus

The establishment of a strategic partnership and further strengthening of relations between India and Armenia may not receive further development after the balance of power in the South Caucasus changes, reads an article titled “Are India and Armenia Moving Toward a Strategic Partnership?” published in The National Interest.

“In the last three years, India has emerged as a major weapons supplier to Armenia. These big-ticket defense deals include the sale of Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, a $40 million contract of SWATHI weapon-locating radars, ammunition anti-tank missiles, and 155 mm artillery guns.”

“In September 2022, both countries signed memoranda of understanding (MOUs) in culture, digital infrastructure, and renewable energy to promote business ties at the India-Armenia Conference 2022 in Bengaluru.

In addition to counter-balance Türkiye and Pakistan, India also looks at Armenia as a nodal point to expand its strategic and economic outreach to the South Caucasus. Delhi’s most critical interests in this region lie in the strategic connectivity projects. Armenia is a natural choice for India because of Azerbaijan’s proximity to Pakistan and Türkiye,” the author noted.

“Delhi’s most critical interests in this region lie in the strategic connectivity projects. India’s interest in the INSTC (International North-South Corridor), of which Armenia is a part, is firmly rooted in its quest for land connectivity to Eurasia, Central Asia, and Europe through the Iranian plateau, otherwise blocked by Pakistan and Afghanistan. Armenia is also keenly interested in INSTC. Yerevan announced an alternate road to Iran in May 2021 to connect Iranian ports to Georgian ports via Armenia. During the Indian foreign minister’s 2021 visit, Armenia also proposed a scheme allowing the transportation of Indian products to Russia and the Black Sea via Armenia.”

However, India’s relative silence after the abolition of separatist regime in Karabakh in 2023 indicates a moderate decline in New Delhi’s enthusiasm for the relationship with Armenia.

The author believes that perhaps, after Azerbaijan cemented its control over Karabakh, India now feels insecure about its investments and plans for strategic connectivity projects in this region.

“In addition to the abovementioned factors, the increasing involvement of global powers in the South Caucasus can also impede the transformation of the India-Armenia relationship into a strategic partnership. After Russia’s lukewarm response to the war with Azerbaijan, there is a marked Armenian shift toward the United States, which is making Moscow uncomfortable. In the recent Russia-Ukraine war, India had to face tremendous pressure from the Western powers to abandon Russia. Given its aversion to alliances, New Delhi would avoid getting caught in another cold war front between the United States and Russia.”

“Hence, it can be argued that in the prevailing uncertainty and instability in the South Caucasus, India will prefer to move ahead on a bilateral trajectory with Armenia, with a particular focus on defense deals and economic ties,” the author added.