After a series of failed projects in Africa, the attention of the French Republic is once again on Eastern Europe and the Middle East. This time, France seems to be in a difficult position of retaking the charge in the EU, much to the displeasure of Germany.
While at the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the French president was open to negotiating with President Putin, a recent change in rhetoric stipulates that his new agenda is to present a new plan to the European Union member states. The plan that Macron opened to discussion was to create a so-called “strategic ambiguity”. A long-term strategy with a goal to keep the Russian political elite guessing on whether the French government will be open to and willing to send the military to the warzone.
In that regard, the interesting change of attitude reveals itself in the change of tone towards Russia from Macron. Giving an interview to a group of regional newspapers, Macron said in 2022: “We must not humiliate Russia so that the day the fighting stops, we can build a way out through diplomatic channels.”
That is a stark contrast to the current narrative of being open to sending the troops to Ukraine if the need arises. And the need, according to Emmanuel Macron may arise at any moment.
Yet, the French neighbours are wary. Germany, Italy and Spain had openly proclaimed that they are not willing to send additional troops to fight the Russian forces on the ground. Yet, the Franco-German differences don’t stop at this matter only. The precise amount of differences and divergences is quite large.
According to the French press, the way in which the Elysée Palace launched the debate on the Western military presence in Ukraine will leave its mark. Olaf Scholz was very unpleasantly surprised that Emmanuel Macron publicly reported on discussions held behind closed doors, and rather annoyed by the French President's account of them. "Emmanuel Macron] said that there was no consensus on the subject, but that's not true: the truth is that France was isolated because most of the participants expressed their clear and unequivocal refusal", says the German side. On the contrary, the Elysée said that the participants had come with full knowledge of the facts and that many of them expressed themselves neither for nor against this prospect, reports Le Monde.
While German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock tried to patch things up between the sides, the process came to a halt on the same day when Emmanuel Macron, speaking from Prague, urged his allies to "live up to history and the courage it implies", saying that Europe was entering a moment "when we must not be cowards". It was the German Defence Minister, Boris Pistorius, who reacted: "We don't need (...) discussions about having more or less courage. That doesn't help solve Ukraine's problems".
The main belief of the differences between Germany and France should come from understanding how the strategies of the two countries differ in principle. The relative unity between the two countries was put to the test from the very first days of the war. "In the week following 24 February, Scholz and Macron both claimed that this war marked a 'change of era', but they drew completely opposite conclusions," explains Claudia Major, a defence specialist at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. While Scholz believes that this war is a sign of the necessity of the presence of the United States in Europe and its influence, the view of Macron was to create a separate approach of increasing the spending on the military and creating a European Union army. That being a united military force, consisting of soldiers from all the EU states as part of one collective force.
On the other hand, Scholz’s belief that the US must play the role of an “umbrella” in Germany and Europe in general did not stop him from investing rapidly in his own military, doubling down on the idea that all member countries of the EU must rise on the occasion. Together but on their own. With the Chancellor's decision to reinvest in defence, the balance of the Franco-German tandem is shattered. "Before the war, there was an implicit division of labour between France and Germany in the world: Berlin provided economic leadership, while Paris had pre-eminence on international and security issues", analyse several French sources. This implicit pact is being called into question because Scholz has decided to invest in both fields, which is basically unacceptable to the French," says one. On the Sky Shield missile defence shield, Scholz's public announcement, without any prior consultation, illustrated the Germans' desire to swim in our lane. Scholz is saying nothing and going it alone.”
So, what represents the current narrative of President Macron in regard to Russia? "Germany recognises that it is afraid of escalation, while France wants to give the impression that it is not afraid", sums up one diplomat, who believes that President Macron wanted to send a message to Mr Scholz that their two countries are not in the same league since the friction that has arisen in recent months over arms deliveries to Ukraine.
Meanwhile this lack of “fear” was demonstrated by the French, during the visit of the French Foreign Minister to Lithuania, last week. In a perfect example of the aggressive foreign policy that the French President leads, or wants people to see, Foreign Minister Stéphane Séjourné openly continued the new line in accordance to the wishes of the French leader. While the Baltic States ministers, present at the meeting, have praised France for “thinking out of the box”, the division within the EU is palpable.
It is becoming more and more clear that the rivalry between Germany and France is slowly getting out of control, and while the German leader tries to find the necessary tools to create the right approach to every conflict, be that the leadership of Germany in the Azerbaijani-Armenian peace process or cautious yet proactive approach to sending arms to Ukraine (Germany is one of the leaders in the process, along Poland), French approach to any conflictual situation at the moment seems to be quite destructive, creating more damage than yielding any positive results. While it is hard to say with certainty that France is sincere in its desire to help Ukraine or Azerbaijani-Armenian reconciliation, the results speak for themselves. French participation in Africa led to its withdrawal from the continent, the ammunition and weapons sent by France to Ukraine lag behind several EU countries and the offer of help to the peace process in the Caucasus is no longer paid attention to. At the end of the day, it is possible that the French government is playing the divide and conquer strategy, with mostly dividing the sides…
Jamal Mustafayev